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TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM VS. THE NATURAL 
RIGHT TO INHERIT: 
THE MISUSE OF NO-CONTEST CLAUSES AS 
DISINHERITANCE DEVICES 
ALEXIS A. GOLLING-SLEDGE* 
ABSTRACT 
Testamentary freedom is the bedrock of inheritance law. The freedom 
is curbed in some respects in order to allow spouses and other groups 
access to an estate. However, there is no restriction on a parent's ability to 
disinherit their children. This note is a critique of the permitted 
disinheritance of children in the name of testamentary freedom. According 
to John Locke, the right to inherit emanates from natural law and should be 
recognized as such. Through forced heirship, as recognized in other modern 
nations, the U.S. can respect the natural right of children to inherit and 
leave room for testamentary freedom. Forced heirship can alleviate the 
unjustifiable harms imposed on adult children and preserve familial 
relationships after the death of a parent. Until forced heirship is recognized, 
disinherited beneficiaries seeking access to an estate must navigate around 
laws governing no-contest clauses, devices that are often used to disinherit 
children. In California, that path is through its probable cause exception to 
no-contest clauses and the intentional interference with an expected 
inheritance tort. Until forced heirship is recognized, courts should not 
permit no-contest clauses to effectuate disinheritance but restrict 
enforcement of no-contest clauses for protecting estates from complicated 
ownership disputes and outsiders attempting to gain access to an estate. 
INTRODUCTION 
Above all else, inheritance law in the United States prioritizes 
testamentary freedom. The law even permits a parent to disinherit his child. 
Unlike many other nations, no statutory protections from disinheritance 
exist for adult children in the United States.1 Disinheritance, or the threat 
thereof, imposes great harm on adult children and families. A right to inherit 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, Washington University School of Law Class of 2020. 
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circumstances. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying discussion. 












emanates from natural law and should be recognized as such. The natural 
right to inherit ought not cede to testamentary freedom but work in tandem 
through forced heirship, whereby children are guaranteed a portion of their 
parents’ estates. 
Disinheritance is often effectuated by court enforcement of no-contest 
clauses.2 No-contest clauses condition a beneficiary’s right to take the share 
provided in the will or trust upon an agreement to acquiesce to its terms.3 
No-contest clauses should be enforced to protect estates from poaching by 
strangers and to avoid resolution of messy ownership disputes;4 no-contest 
clauses should not be used to disinherit children. 
The traditional family is the basis of inheritance law.5 Some argue that 
the traditional family has evolved so dramatically in modern times that it is 
no longer a workable framework.6 Non-traditional families are now the 
norm, leaving non-marital children and children of divorce vulnerable to 
disinheritance. All children, regardless of age, have a natural right to inherit 
a share from their parents and that the protections that exist for surviving 
spouses should extend to all children through forced heirship.7 Forced 
heirship will preserve and strengthen the family paradigm, promote social 
mobility, and is consistent with the law’s favor for vibrant markets and 
limits on deadhand control.8 
No-contest clauses are a popular disinheritance device that may impose 
a penalty for challenging a will. Many states provide a narrow exception for 
beneficiaries to challenge a will containing a no-contest clause without 
triggering a penalty. California provides a probable cause exception that 
permits a successful challenge to a will containing a no-contest clause.9 In 
2007, California undertook a close look at the law governing no-contest 
clauses and made revisions,10 making its law primed for examining the 
 
 
2.  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
INHERITANCE LAW 12 (Stanford Law Books 2009). 
3.  CAL. PROB. CODE § 21310(C) (West 2011). 
4.  See infra notes 64-66, 87-92. 
5.  Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 200-01 
(2001). 
6.  Id. at 204. 
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contours of the probable cause exception. This note will also discuss the 
purpose of no-contest clauses for respecting testamentary freedom. That 
purpose will be juxtaposed with the actual practice of using no-contest 
clauses to disinherit children. This note argues that these clauses are 
misused to disinherit children and that such misuse is inconsistent with the 
clauses’ purpose. Testamentary freedom should work in tandem with the 
right to inherit by providing statutory protection from disinheritance,11 as it 
does for surviving spouses. 
Part I will introduce the tension between testamentary freedom, 
specifically disinheritance, in inheritance law and the natural right to inherit. 
Part II will describe the rationale behind testamentary freedom and the 
purpose of no-contest clauses. Part II will also discuss the limits of 
testamentary freedom and identify the negative effects of disinheritance on 
families and children. Part III will argue for a natural right to inherit and 
advocate for protection of all children from disinheritance by instituting 
forced heirship. Part III will also introduce policy rationales for forced 
heirship and models from civil law countries. Finally, Part III will introduce 
other avenues to avoid disinheritance under the current law. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO NATURAL LAW 
Testamentary freedom is the guiding principle behind succession law 
and one of many important American values.12 It is essentially the power or 
right to distribute one’s property after death to whomever one chooses and 
in any manner.13 All of the freedoms we value in the U.S., including 
individual liberty and property rights are limited because these freedoms 
may not infringe upon the rights of others. By contrast, testamentary 
freedom permits a decedent to infringe upon a natural right to inherit. In this 
way, the “deadhand” controls her beneficiaries. In many instances, the law 
limits deadhand control, such as with the Rule Against Perpetuities14 and 
the provision of an elective share for surviving spouses.15 Yet, the law fully 
allows the deadhand to pervade the lives of beneficiaries without ever 
 
 
 11. Adam Dayan, The Kids Aren’t Alright: An Examination of Some of the Flaws in American 
Law Regarding Child Disinheritance, the Reasons that Children Should be Protected, and a 
Recommendation for the United States to Learn from the Australian Model that Protects Children 
Against Disinheritance, 17 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 375, 402 (2009). 
12. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 46. 
13.  Id. at 19. 
14.   The Rule Against Perpetuities invalidates testamentary dispositions that go beyond a life in 
being plus 21 years. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
10.1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 15.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 125. 












having to face the life-altering consequences and family disruption that can 
ensue.16 
Natural law, as generally understood, stands at the intersection of law 
and morality. It answers the question of what is the law, as it ought to be?17 
Natural law is the theory that law is fixed and exists independently of what 
the law may presently be.18 It is the law of nature as distinguished from the 
law of man.19 Philosophers use reason to discover natural law and have at 
times found conflict between natural law and man-made, or positive, law.20 
For example, the American Revolution was justified in terms of natural law. 
21 The Revolutionaries argued that British law (man-made or positive law) 
infringed natural law, individuals’ “self-evident,” “unalienable” rights, 
“endowed by their Creator.”22 
Legal philosophers resolve conflict between natural and positive law by 
identifying the different objectives between the two philosophies. As stated, 
philosophers studying natural law use reason to find law as fixed in nature,23 
whereas lawmakers create positive law by considering the common good to 
achieve the best societal outcome.24 This note endorses the right to inherit 
as natural law, consistent with the views of John Locke and the practices of 
other industrialized countries. 
The law presently allows testamentary freedom to override the natural 
right of inheritance by permitting a testator to disinherit their children. The 
natural right of inheritance should not yield to testamentary freedom. 
Instead, the law should reconcile both testamentary freedom and the right 
to inherit through forced heirship whereby children are guaranteed a portion 
of their parents’ estates. 
II. FREEDOM OF TESTATION 
The freedom to give property to another or to withhold it, known as 
testamentary freedom, is a fundamental tenet in American estate law. Courts 
generally respect testamentary freedom, subject to a few rules. A sampling 
 
 
 16.  Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 
1, 13 (1992). 
 17.   RAYMOND WACKS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 1 (Oxford 
University Press 2006). 
 18.  Id. at 2. 
 19.  Id. at 3. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 5. 
 22.  WACKS, supra note 17; see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 23.  WACKS, supra note 17, at 7. 













of such rules include the requirement of paying estate taxes, the requirement 
of repaying debts to creditors, spousal rights to half or a third of an estate, 
and the access rights of pretermitted (omitted or unknown) children.25 Every 
jurisdiction opens certain access to portions of an estate even if the 
decedent’s intention was to block access.26 In spite of these protections, one 
large group can be completely excluded from an estate – children. It is legal 
and quite easy for a testator to leave nothing to some or all of her children. 
This note argues that the law should recognize the right to inherit as a natural 
right and should protect children of all ages from disinheritance. 
Justifications for testamentary freedom are based on the decedent’s 
prerogative.27 Philosopher and progenitor of American property law John 
Locke recognized a natural right to bequeath.28 The State of California has 
expressed that the law should preserve decedent’s intent, as it is her 
property.29 Medieval jurist Henry de Bracton argued that testamentary 
freedom spurs productivity and saving.30 Many social scientists agree that 
without testamentary freedom, wealth maximization will shrink as persons 
choose to accumulate less.31 Testamentary freedom also comports with 
popular attitudes.32 At the same time, significant portions of society feel that 
parents generally intend to leave an inheritance for their children and that 
disinheritance is immoral.33 
Disinherited children often opt to challenge the validity of a will; such 
a challenge is their only remedy.34 Will challenges present many difficulties, 
including the cost of litigation, bitterness between surviving family 
members, and obstacles in the law itself. Disinherited children have had 
some success in gaining access to an estate with claims such as lack of 
capacity,35 undue influence,36 or fraud.37 Such children have found that it 
 
 
25.  Estate of Smith, 9 Cal. 3d 74, 81-82 (Cal. 1973). 
26.  Deborah A. Batts, I Didn’t Ask to be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance and a 
Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1221-22 (1990). 
27.  ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 16 (Wolters 
Kluwer Law & Business 2017). 
28.  JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1988) (1690). 
29.  Revision Report, supra note 10, at 364-65. 
30.  Hirsch, supra note 16, at 8. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. at 14. 
33.  Batts, supra note 26, at 1224. 
34.  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 27, at 564. 
35.  See, e.g., Gregge v. Hugill, 1 Cal. App. 5th 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (grandson petitioning 
to determine validity of grandfather’s trust containing a no contest clause and alleging undue influence). 
36.  See, e.g., Lintz v. Lintz, 222 Cal. App. 4th 1346 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (children alleging 
undue influence against widow). 
37.  See, e.g., David v. Hermann, 129 Cal. App. 4th 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (older sister 












helps to appeal to the judiciary’s sense of fairness and appeal to 
sympathies.38 Judges and juries are more likely to find undue influence or 
incapacity if the testator’s dispositions seem unfair.39 
To keep disinheritances airtight and enforceable, many testators and 
estate planning attorneys utilize no-contest clauses as disinheritance 
devices.40 These clauses condition a gift on the beneficiary’s decision to not 
contest the will or trust.41 Otherwise, the beneficiary risks forfeiture. An 
example of such a clause is: If anyone challenges this will, they will receive 
$1. An effective no-contest clause deters potential will challenges by baiting 
beneficiaries with a sufficient benefit, or else the contestant has nothing to 
lose.42 No-contest clauses are enforceable in most states and by the Uniform 
Probate Code (“UPC”).43 In California, no-contest clauses are applied 
conservatively because the law disfavors forfeiture and because courts see 
it as a harsh penalty.44 No-contest clauses are even enforceable against 
surviving spouses who assert rights contrary to the decedent’s estate plan.45 
California’s Law Revision Commission cites several reasons for the 
state’s enforcement of no-contest clauses. It cites public policies including 
interests in finality, discouraging litigation, and respecting the testator’s 
intent.46 There are also interests in the right of a citizen to have his claim 
determined by law and guarding against abuse of elderly testators and 
related opportunism.47 These public policies facilitate the fair and efficient 
administration of estates and protect testamentary freedom.48 Practically, 
the state seeks to avoid the cost, delay, and public exposure involved in 
litigation over the estate.49 Though no-contest clauses are used to disinherit 
children,50 California cites “discord between beneficiaries”51 as one of its 
 
 
alleging claims of undue influence and fraud against younger sister). 
38.  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 27, at 564. 
39.  Foster, supra note 5, at 210-12. 
40.  See, e.g., Burch v. George, 7 Cal. 4th 246, 265 (Cal. 1994). 
41.  See, e.g., Tunstall v. Wells, 144 Cal. App. 4th 554, 562 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
42.  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 27, at 302-03. 
43.  Id. at 303. 
44.  Revision Report, supra note 10, at 369-70; See also CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21303, 21304 
(West 2011). 
45.  Burch, supra note 40, at 267-68. 
46.  Revision Report, supra note 10, at 364-68. See also CAL. PROB. CODE § 21310(c) (West 
2011). 
47.  See Lobb v. Brown, 208 Cal. 476, 490-92 (1929). 
48.  Revision Report, supra note 10, at 395. 
49.  Id. at 364-366, 389. 
50.  See infra notes 72-125. 
51.  Gregge, 1 Cal. App. 5th at 571 (citing Estate of Schuster, 163 Cal. App. 3d 337, 342 (Cal. 













justifications for enforcing the clauses.52 Despite the lofty goals articulated 
by the state and its courts, the disinheritance of children carried out by no-
contest clauses undermines state interests and destroys family ties. 
Despite a testator’s best efforts to keep her instruments airtight, there 
are some loopholes in the law. The UPC and most states, including 
California, deem no-contest clauses ineffectual if the beneficiary had 
reasonable or probable cause to contest the will.53 California courts have yet 
to develop a full body of case law regarding what constitutes probable cause. 
Very few cases have successfully challenged wills with probable cause, 
which would grant a disinherited child access to an estate.54 In these rare 
successful will challenges, the entire instrument falls, including the no-
contest clause.55 Unfortunately for beneficiaries, California case law 
contains plenty of failed will challenges that trigger enforcement of the no-
contest clause resulting in a penalty that worked forfeiture on the 
beneficiary.56 Even though we have only seen enforcement of no-contest 
clauses occur in the specific event of a failed will challenge, the clauses are 
extremely effective at dissuading dissatisfied beneficiaries from a will 
challenge, especially if a generous gift is dangling in the estate.57 
Because case law provides so little guidance for what constitutes the 
probable cause exception to a no-contest clause that avoids triggering a 
penalty, dissatisfied beneficiaries have tried several strategies. Undue 
influencers and other bad actors have even tried to take advantage of no-
contest clauses to keep their access to an estate.58 No-contest clauses deter 
will challenges and thus shield fraud, duress, menace, or undue influence 
from judicial review.59 The probable cause exception to a no-contest clause 
allows courts to hear legitimate challenges while protecting testamentary 
intent. A disinherited beneficiary who can point to an undue influencer who 
interfered with an inheritance may have a legal basis to institute a will 
challenge without triggering the no-contest clause.60 
Other beneficiaries have successfully invalidated vague no-contest 
clauses altogether. In California, courts disregard generic no-contest 
 
 
52.  Revision Report, supra note 10, at 365. 
53.  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 27, at 303; see also UPC §§ 2-517, 3-309. 
54.  See infra notes 117-120. 
55.  Cal. Prac. Guide: Probate, Litigation (b) (Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 15:85. 
56.  See infra notes 107-116. 
57.  Estate of Ferber, 66 Cal. App. 4th 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); see also Wells, 144 Cal. App. 
4th at 562 n.6. 
58.  Revision Report, supra note 10, at 388. 
59.  Id. at 362. 
60.  Gregge, 1 Cal. App. 5th at 570. 












clauses.61 The clauses must be drafted with particularity and specificity 
regarding who is covered and what type of actions apply.62 Courts require 
the testator to clearly indicate an intention to disinherit, “by express words 
or necessary implication.”63 A disinherited child may consider an argument 
that the no-contest clause is insufficient and fails to be sufficiently clear in 
identifying to whom it applies. 
This note argues that the use of no-contest clause is proper in two 
instances: to protect against poaching from strangers and to avoid litigating 
complicated ownership issues.64 Many testators’ financials and assets 
become intermingled. It can be administratively difficult to reorganize and 
re-characterize ownership of assets.65 Real estate may be mortgaged. 
Partnerships and limited liability corporations may possess ownership. Co-
tenancies and gifts may be unaccounted for. Community property and 
separate property may not be clearly delineated. One revenue stream may 
be the unknown source of funds for another person or venture. The purpose 
of no-contest clauses should be to guard against opportunism and poorly 
organized estates.66 Their use should be limited to shielding from poachers 
and minimizing expense and delay. 
A high-profile example of such a scenario is in the case of Anna Nicole 
Smith. The attorney who drafted Anna Nicole Smith’s testamentary no-
contest clause admitted in court proceedings that he wrote it too broadly.67 
The no-contest clause stated that no one other than Anna’s living son would 
inherit.68 Sadly, Anna’s son passed away after the creation of the will, and 
Anna never updated the will. According to Anna’s attorney, the purpose of 
the no-contest clause was to guard against claims on Anna’s estate by her 
estranged mother or others.69 However, this broad no-contest clause had the 
practical effect of disinheriting Anna’s newborn daughter.70 The court 
ultimately decided that certain ambiguities in the trust would favor the 
newborn child.71 Thanks to the judge, Anna’s daughter was the sole 
beneficiary of Anna’s estate. 
 
 
61.  Aviles v. Swearingen, 16 Cal. App. 5th 485, 492 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). 
62.  Id. 
63.  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 27, at 581. 
64.  Ferber, supra note 57. 
65.  Revision Report, supra note 10, at 367-68. 
66.  Donkin v. Donkin, 58 Cal. 4th 412, 425 (Cal. 2013). 
67.  SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 27, at 582. 
68.  Id. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. 













A. No-Contest Clauses as Disinheritance Devices 
Challenging a will containing a no-contest clause is risky. A court may 
find that a contestant brought a contest without probable cause and thus 
triggered the no-contest clause. The following cases, all from California 
Courts of Appeal, demonstrate scenarios in which the court found that 
beneficiaries did not bring a direct contest and, therefore, that they did not 
risk triggering the no-contest clause. 
1. Challenges Found to Be Indirect Contests 
In Donkin v. Donkin,72 trust beneficiaries petitioned the court to 
interpret an ambiguous trust amendment.73 The court held that the 
beneficiaries’ challenge did not constitute a direct contest. The court 
determined that the petition was only an effort to interpret an amendment in 
the face of suspected misconduct by the successor trustees.74 The court 
viewed this type of inquiry as consistent with public policy and reasoned 
that it was critical that the beneficiaries were not challenging the execution 
of the trust amendment, or alleging that it was void, but only seeking to 
clarify how the trust amendment should be applied because of an ambiguous 
clause.75 The court held that even arguing in favor of one interpretation over 
a different interpretation did not violate the no-contest clause.76 Donkin 
stands for the proposition that requests to interpret or clarify an instrument 
will not trigger the no-contest clause and result in disinheritance. 
In Johnson v. Greenelsh,77 the court held that a beneficiary challenging 
a testator’s mental capacity to exercise rights under a trust was not a direct 
contest. The beneficiary petitioned to compel arbitration challenging the 
testator’s withdrawal of trust assets and the appointment of successor 
trustee. The court found that the beneficiary did not seek to thwart the estate 
plan78 but sought to determine a settlor’s capacity.79 The court reasoned that 
the contest was not directed at the instrument itself but at separate 
documents appointing the successor trustee and the memorandum notifying 
the trustees of testator’s withdrawal of assets.80 The court pointed out that 
 
 
72.  Donkin, 58 Cal. 4th at 425. 
73.  Id. at 415. 
74.  Id. at 433-34. 
75.  Id. at 434-35. 
76.  Id. at 437. 
77.  Johnson v. Greenelsh, 47 Cal. 4th 598, 604 (Cal. 2009). 
78.  Id. at 599. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. 












even though the result of this successful indirect contest would mean that 
the beneficiaries would receive a larger portion of the trust estate, as long 
as it was consistent with what was set forth in the trust and consistent with 
trustee’s fiduciary obligations, it was not a direct contest.81 Because this 
challenge to restore property to the survivor’s trust was based on a lack of 
capacity claim and not a challenge to unravel the decedent’s plan, the court 
held that it did not violate the no-contest clause.82 Johnson v. Greenelsh 
demonstrates that a successful challenge to documents other than the trust 
itself does not necessarily trigger the no-contest clause, even if beneficiaries 
may receive a larger portion of the estate. 
In Estate of Ferber,83 the court declared the right of beneficiaries to 
challenge the actions of the fiduciaries without violating the no-contest 
clause, as long as the challenges were not frivolous.84 The court reasoned 
that a no-contest clause that sought to insulate the executor completely from 
removal in order to guard against vigilante beneficiaries violated the public 
policy behind court supervision of probate matters and overseeing errors or 
misconduct in execution.85 The court determined that a no-contest clause 
was unenforceable against valid objections to the fiduciary’s accounting or 
valid attempts to remove the fiduciary.86 Ferber stands for the proposition 
that courts favor reasonable supervision of fiduciaries. 
In Estate of Dayan,87 the court held that defendant had not violated the 
no-contest clause because he did not directly challenge the alleged invalidity 
of a protected instrument.88 He only contended that he was entitled to a one-
third interest in the real property due to a quitclaim deed conveyed prior to 
the execution of the will.89 The court reasoned that the gravamen of 
defendant’s action was to enforce rights, not to invalidate any portion of the 
will.90 The court found that the opposition to the petition for an order to 
establish that testator’s estate had title to real property in its entirety was not 
a direct contest.91 The court concluded that the testator did not intend for a 
will provision that directed her executor to transfer “all title, rights and 
 
 
81.  Id. at 607-09. 
82.  Johnson, 47 Cal. 4th 598 at 609. 
83.  Ferber, supra note 57. 
84.  Id. at 254-55. 
85.  Id. at 253. 
86.  Id. at 255. 
87.  Estate of Dayan, 5 Cal. App. 5th 29 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
88.  Id. at 721. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. 













interests” in the real property to apply to defendant’s one-third interest.92 
We learn here that the court will permit questions of title and ownership to 
proceed without violating the no-contest clause. 
The preceding cases demonstrate the kinds of challenges, indirect 
contests, permitted by California Courts of Appeal without triggering the 
no-contest clause. Challenges that do not trigger the no-contest clause 
include 1) an interpretation of a trust amendment, 2) attacks on documents 
other than the instrument itself, 3) fiduciary supervision, and 4) title and 
ownership disputes. However, these successful indirect contests may not go 
far enough in granting a disinherited beneficiary access to an estate. 
As discussed, no-contest clauses are generally enforceable; but with 
some limitations.93 The majority rule, as codified in the UPC and recognized 
in California,94 is the probable cause exception.95 The exception limits 
enforcement of no-contest clauses to direct contests brought without 
probable cause.96 Under this exception, a beneficiary avoids the penalty in 
the no-contest clause if there was probable cause to institute the direct 
contest.97 Whether there has been a direct contest98 depends upon the 
circumstances of the case and the language used in the clause. As seen 
above, a court may find that a particular challenge was actually an indirect 
contest,99 which will not trigger the clause.100 The standard for a finding of 
probable cause is if at the time of filing, the facts known to the contestant 
would cause a reasonable person to believe that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the requested relief will be granted after an opportunity for 
further investigation or discovery.101 
If a disinherited beneficiary takes her chances to challenge a testator’s 
will, the goal is to do so without triggering the no-contest clause. An 
unsuccessful direct contest contains no probable cause,102 results in 
 
 
92.  Dayan, 5 Cal. App. 5th. 
93.  Revision Report, supra note 10, at 374. 
94.  CAL. PROB. CODE § 21311(a)(1) (West 2010). 
95.  Revision Report, supra note 10, at 374. 
96.  See § 21311(a); see also Donkin, 58 Cal. App. 4th at 412. 
97.  LAWRENCE H. AVERILL, JR. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE IN A NUTSHELL 197 (5th ed., 2001). 
98.  A “direct contest” is defined as a “contest that alleges the invalidity of an instrument… or 
any of the terms…based on any specified grounds including lack of capacity or undue influence.” 
Revision Report, supra note 10, at 401. 
99.  An indirect contest is an action (other than a direct contest) that attempts to invalidate an 
instrument or its term(s). CAL. PROB. CODE § 21300(c) (West 2010). 
100.  Donkin, 58 Cal. App. 4th at 426. 
101. The law applies to any instrument, whenever executed, which became irrevocable on or 
after January 1, 2001. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21311(b) (West 2010). 
102.  Alvarez v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 4th 642, 653 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 












enforcement of the no-contest clause,103 and certainly triggers forfeiture. A 
disinherited beneficiary wants to avoid this scenario. Conversely, a 
successful direct contest certainly constitutes probable cause thus entitling 
the beneficiary to a share104 and avoiding the no-contest clause and any 
forfeiture. The law is clear that indirect contests do not trigger no-contest 
clauses.105 The cases of Donkin, Johnson, Ferber, and Dayan demonstrate 
what constitutes an indirect contest.106 The probable cause exception applies 
only to successful direct contests. A direct contest brought with probable 
cause would avoid triggering enforcement of a no-contest clause, thus 
granting a disinherited beneficiary access to an estate from which she was 
improperly denied the natural right to inherit. We proceed to explore direct 
contests and what constitutes probable cause in California Courts of Appeal. 
2. Challenges Found to be Direct Contests with No Probable Cause 
Direct contests brought without probable cause are exactly the type of 
challenge that guarantees that the no-contest clause will be triggered. The 
following cases illustrate judicial sensitivity towards a perceived effort to 
frustrate the decedent’s wishes, or testamentary intent. In each of these 
cases, the court found that the beneficiary’s challenge was a direct contest 
brought without probable cause, which would trigger a no-contest clause. 
In Urick v. Urick,107 the court engaged in a full probable cause analysis 
in the context of deciding a motion to strike. Brother-beneficiary conceded 
that his mother had handwritten a note disinheriting him but alleged that she 
did not later sign amendments prepared by an attorney.108 He alleged that 
his mother had reinstated her trust in full with her son as beneficiary.109 
After the mother’s death, sister-beneficiary filed a reformation petition to 
remove brother-beneficiary based on information that she did not have at 
that time but hoped to find in communications revealing mother’s 
testamentary intent.110 The court rejected the sister’s challenge and said that 
the allegations fell short as a matter of law. The court found that sister-
beneficiary lacked a reasonable basis to believe the relief she requested 
would be granted based on the information available to her or after 
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discovery.111 The court reasoned that the sister did not meet the burden for 
relief, even if the probate court was likely to eliminate brother-beneficiary’s 
interest.112 Urick illustrates that one must have reasonable knowledge of 
facts and relief for the court to permit a will challenge.113 
In Schwartz v. Schwartz,114 the court held that a trust beneficiary’s 
petition for an order directing a trustee to divide the property of a survivor’s 
trust equally between himself and beneficiary under the terms of the trust 
violated the no-contest clause. The court reasoned that the beneficiary 
triggered the clause through her failure to give any force or effect to a 
handwritten change to the settlor’s will. The court found that the no-contest 
clause covered any attempt to void the instrument.115 The court found that 
the clear purpose of the beneficiary’s petition was to defeat testamentary 
intent by nullifying the handwritten note and distributing the trust in a way 
not contemplated or specified in settlor’s estate plan.116 Schwartz is 
illustrative of the court’s willingness to penalize beneficiaries who 
challenge valid writings. 
Urick and Schwartz are worst-case scenarios for disinherited 
beneficiaries. Disinherited beneficiaries must avoid attempts to thwart an 
estate plan. Further, disinherited beneficiaries must only challenge 
instruments if there is a reasonable basis of knowledge on which to proceed. 
3. Challenge Found to be Direct Contest with Probable Cause 
As discussed, a beneficiary’s goal is to avoid triggering the no-contest 
clause by bringing a direct contest with probable cause. In Doolittle v. 
Exchange Bank,117 a beneficiary commenced an action to invalidate two 
trust amendments on the grounds of undue influence and lack of 
testamentary capacity.118 The court found that the trust directive ordering 
trustee to defend against challenges at the expense of the trust did not 
penalize the beneficiary. The court reasoned that the trust directive was not 
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without probable cause.119 While the directive reduced the beneficiary’s 
share if she prevailed in litigation, the court stated that it had the same effect 
on others if the beneficiary did not prevail.120 Here we learn that a court may 
look to whether the challenging beneficiary will benefit from the litigation. 
A finding of undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity certainly 
constitutes probable cause. 
B. Restraints on Testamentary Freedom 
As shown, disinherited beneficiaries, including children, have barely 
any roadmap to avoid triggering the no-contest clause. The deadhand is 
strong against children. However, certain groups cannot be disinherited 
because of guaranteed statutory access to an estate’s funds. 
Surviving spouses are protected from disinheritance with a guaranteed 
right to one-third or one-half of the estate.121 Some states, such as California, 
provide protection for omitted (i.e., unknown or unborn) children of 
testators through “pretermission” statutes.122 Louisiana is the only state that 
protects living children up to age 24 and all disabled children from 
disinheritance.123 The state (through taxes) and creditors are guaranteed 
what is owed from an estate.124 These protections impose significant 
restraints on testamentary freedom by preventing the testator from 
excluding spouses, omitted children, the state, and creditors from an estate. 
Yet, no state protects all children from disinheritance. Children who are 
expressly given nothing are largely left without a remedy.125 All children, 
regardless of age or need, should be added to the list of groups guaranteed 
access to an estate with a right of inheritance for the same reasons that 
guarantees exist for surviving spouses. 
Surviving spouses have widespread protection from disinheritance. All 
separate property126 states except Georgia127 have enacted statues to protect 
surviving spouses from disinheritance.128 Spousal protections against 
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disinheritance are built into the community property system, like 
California.129 In separate property states, the common law reflects the notion 
that a husband is responsible for finances and that a wife’s responsibility is 
domestic.130 Community property law is based on the theory of an economic 
partnership in which half of what is acquired during marriage also belongs 
to the spouse.131 In California, if one spouse dies without a will, the 
surviving spouse can inherit all community property.132 If there is a will, 
virtually all states provide that a spouse who is dissatisfied with her 
provision may opt for an elective share of either one-third or one-half of the 
estate.133 Spouses are very well protected in the law. 
The law protects spouses in several factual scenarios. The law supposes 
that surviving spouses contribute to the acquisition of property,134 even if 
no tangible contributions were made at all. The protection may ensure that 
spouses are entitled to any assets that are titled in the testator’s name 
alone.135 The testator may have minor children left to be cared for by the 
surviving spouse. The surviving spouse may have relied solely on the 
testator’s income and not have any finances of their own. Through statutes, 
each state ensures that surviving spouses are safe from any unfair treatment 
by the decedent, whether justified or rashly decided. 
These factual scenarios may also exist for children of testators, but 
disinherited children are not provided with the guarantee of any share.136 
Adult children may have relied on parents for financial support or even 
provided care to the parent. Adult children may have been supporting the 
parent financially without any formal titled ownership. Adult children may 
have been born of a previous or subsequent partner and suffered unfair 
treatment. A disinherited child may be victim to a parent’s rash decision-
making or harsh punishment. Family members may simply be unable to 
make amends. Arguably, a child’s interest may be stronger than that of a 
surviving spouse.137 Spouses voluntarily enter a marriage and have the 
potential to remarry while children do not choose their parents.138 All 
children, regardless of age, should be protected from disinheritance just as 
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Most states and the UPC140 prevent disinheritance of unknown children 
and children born after the decedent’s death through pretermitted heir 
statutes.141 These statutes protect against unintentional disinheritance in 
case of mistake or oversight.142 Similar statutes should be enacted to protect 
living children, regardless of age, from all disinheritance, whether 
intentional or unintentional. This type of forced share would account for any 
unfair circumstances that may arise and would preserve the natural right to 
inherit. 
In Louisiana, where the French Civil Code was adopted, a testator may 
not disinherit a child that is a forced heir from an estate unless an exception 
applies.143 “Forced heir” is defined narrowly as a child under the age of 24 
or physically or mentally incapacitated.144 Louisiana allows for disinheriting 
a forced heir only for specific statutory exceptions such as violence, 
commission of a crime, or no contact with the parent without just cause for 
two years during adulthood.145 The forced share is one-fourth of the estate 
for one child and one-half of the estate for two or more children.146 
Louisiana’s law is based on the right idea that minor and young adult 
children should be protected from disinheritance, but it does not go far 
enough. Louisiana’s law should be expanded to include children of all ages 
and adopted in other jurisdictions. 
American inheritance law encourages those who have earned real and 
personal property during their lifetimes to provide for their family after 
death.147 In light of the social changes that predominate modern American 
society, including fewer marriages, blended families, single-parent 
households, and same sex marriages,148 the traditional family paradigm may 
no longer be a relevant framework on which to base inheritance law.149 
Social norms have changed and many desire to leave property and assets to 
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individuals outside of the traditional family (i.e. stepchildren, caregivers, 
charity, friends, etc.).150 As a result, the parent-child relationship is left 
vulnerable to alienation and disaffection.151 Children born out of wedlock, 
children of one-parent households, and children of previous marriages are 
especially at risk of disinheritance152 if a parent no longer has, or perhaps 
never had, any role in the child’s life.153 Non-custodial parents may not 
consider the child “a natural object of their bounty.”154 Some children, due 
to circumstances outside of their control, may not have had the ability, 
opportunity, or invitation to nurture a relationship with a parent. Parents 
may have never had the courage to develop a relationship with their 
children. In light of the testamentary freedom to easily disinherit children,155 
the law should do more to protect vulnerable children as the traditional 
family paradigm becomes increasingly less relevant. 
When deciding to disinherit children, parents may weigh any number 
of reasons, arbitrary or punitive.156 The law permits parents to ostracize 
children because the parent was unmarried to or divorced from the co-
parent.157 Parents may not approve of certain lifestyle choices, unsavory 
behavior, substance abuse, or other health needs. Parents may perceive the 
child as financially secure not in need of an inheritance.158 Parents may also 
have concerns about potential misuse, mismanagement, debt, poor advice, 
or waste.159 It is questionable whether many children with inheritances truly 
deserve to inherit; yet they still do. Disinheritance should not be used to 
punish or express disapproval of the child for misdeeds, disappointment, or 
for circumstances outside of the child’s control. 
There are several property management options that address such 
paternalistic concerns without resorting to disinheritance.160 Any of these 
same concerns can also apply to spouses, yet surviving spouses are legally 
entitled to a significant portion of an estate without question. Spouses have 
the potential to remarry or squander an inheritance. Stepparents may 
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completely disavow children of the decedent. Children should not have to 
earn an inheritance, nor should they lose an inheritance for bad behavior or 
circumstances outside of their control. A child’s natural right to inherit 
should not yield to arbitrary and unfair exercises of testamentary freedom. 
Disinheritance can take a psychological and emotional toll on adult 
children.161 Besides the financial impact, an inheritance is a connection to a 
loved one after death.162 Even when the parent and child were not very close, 
disinheritance can be very difficult to come to terms with.163 A disinherited 
heir may feel hurt, treated unfairly, and betrayed.164 A will challenge may 
be the only recourse for these emotional injuries and personal rejection, 
especially when other siblings, distant relatives, friends, and others are left 
with gifts.165 
Instead of permitting parents to disinherit children deemed as unworthy, 
states could adopt universally agreeable rules that govern who should be 
barred from inheritance.166 Every jurisdiction has adopted slayer laws, 
which prohibit a person who has killed another from inheriting from his 
victim.167 California disinherits anyone guilty of “physical abuse, neglect, 
or fiduciary abuse of an… older or dependent adult.”168 The UPC bars a 
parent from inheriting from a child whose parental rights could have been 
terminated.169 Such examples may be universally agreeable reasons to 
disinherit children. 
III. NATURAL RIGHT OF INHERITANCE 
Philosopher and progenitor of American property law John Locke 
recognized the right to bequest170 and an unqualified, natural right to 
unlimited inheritance171 in his general theory of property set forth in the Two 
Treatises.172 American property law recognizes the breadth of the right to 
bequest as testamentary freedom.173 However, the right to inherit is only 
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recognized in intestate law.174 American law is unique in its regard of the 
right to inherit as subordinate to a decedent’s testamentary freedom.175 
Locke’s unqualified, unlimited inheritance theory remains at odds with the 
permitted disinheritance of children in American law.176 
In dicta, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the right to inherit as a 
natural right.177 Yet, case law continually treats inheritance as a statutory 
right and privilege.178 Though the regulation and taxation of estates is 
inarguably legal positivism, there is no basis to conclude that the inheritance 
right itself is man-made.179 The right to inherit is recognized by Locke and 
predates the statutory right to testamentary freedom.180 In all states and the 
UPC, the default rule for testators who die intestate181 is that each and every 
child of a testator has an inheritance right.182 Intestate law seeks to reflect 
the probable intent of a decedent by creating majoritarian default rules.183 
Intestate law’s recognition of the right to inherit is strong evidence that it is 
indeed a natural right.184 As the law stands, a child’s natural right to inherit 
can be infringed by testamentary freedom. Both natural rights recognized 
by Locke, the rights to bequest and inherit, should work in tandem185 and 
unrestricted by the other. 
The American legal system should adopt a forced heirship regime that 
protects children from disinheritance because such a regime will maintain 
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and perpetuate the social family unit that is traditionally deemed essential 
for a stable and productive society.186 Disinheritance can lead to family 
discord, division, and social and emotional consequences. Popular attitudes 
suggest that disinheritance is viewed as morally reprehensible and can lead 
to fracturing of families and fraternal competition.187 Will challenges cause 
family relationships to disintegrate based on anger and disappointment that 
hinge on inheritance.188 The law should recognize the natural right to inherit 
for the preservation of family ties.189  
While the decedent is dead and gone, the survivors must carry out 
deadhand control while dealing with loss. A dissatisfied heir may file suit 
to gain access to an estate, causing bitterness and resentment among family, 
often between surviving spouses and children.190 Nasty quarrels may ensue, 
leaving existing relationships broken and hateful.191 Bad situations 
involving grief become much worse.192 Certainly, the testator has earned 
everything that is being left behind, but he cannot take anything with him. 
The deadhand should not have complete controlling power. Once a testator 
dies, the interests of survivors should be prioritized.193 Forced heirship can 
dramatically alleviate disputes between family members and limit deadhand 
influence on family relationships that inevitably go on after the decedent’s 
death. 
Forced heirship was “designed to alleviate disharmony among children 
by limiting inequality that a parent might impose.”194 When a sibling is 
disinherited, greed can take hold and loyalties can be challenged.195 Equality 
through forced heirship can preserve or jumpstart sibling relationships 
especially for half-siblings, adopted siblings, and stepsiblings after the death 
of a parent. The law should enforce a measure of equality among all of a 
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An inheritance can change the course of a person’s life, and forced 
heirship may encourage individual freedom. Such a windfall has the 
potential to relieve incredible hardship or spur new opportunities.197 An 
inheritance can impact one’s ability to buy a home, receive an education, 
set aside for retirement funds, aid in crisis, pay healthcare costs, fund start-
up costs for a business, and much more.198 Financial resources dictate 
quality of life by providing structure, creating a livelihood, determining 
where we reside, and defining our self-image and class in society.199 Some 
critics argue that inheritance causes children to lead less productive lives, 
though increasingly long life expectancies largely rebuff this notion.200 The 
idea of a “trust fund kid” is a trope; children are typically middle-aged or 
older, not silver-spooned twenty-somethings when parents pass away.201 
With the threat of disinheritance always looming, children may tend to 
appease their parents and take fewer risks in life in order to maintain access 
to an inheritance. In addition, the motivation to be successful does not derive 
from an expected inheritance but from the very idea that whatever we earn 
will be passed down to our children, perhaps out of love or a sense of 
immortality.202 
In addition to protecting the natural right to inherit, forced heirship may 
encourage active land markets. American law fundamentally disfavors 
restraints on alienation.203 Public policy dictates that land should always be 
alienable and available for sale on the market.204 Forced heirship is likely to 
result in shared property by multiple owners. Multiple owners may find it 
cumbersome to collectively manage property. A more vibrant land market 
may emerge as multiple owners opt to sell instead of dealing with the 
administrative burden involved in co-tenancies, etc. 
A guaranteed right to inherit for children of testators would 
complement, not conflict, with state interests. So long as children have a 
recognized right of inheritance from their parents, the state is less compelled 
to intervene.205 A forced share would result in fewer will challenges and less 
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use of judicial resources.206 State resources can go to other welfare 
assistance, public education, criminal justice, etc. If a decedent parent has 
the assets to fund new investments, educational pursuits, home buying, or 
other ventures, then she should do so before the state.207 States have an 
opportunity to serve the public interest of wealth spreading and wealth-
preservation208 by considering the adoption of forced heirship in inheritance 
law. 
Modernized countries around the world statutorily protect children from 
disinheritance. Forced heirship is widely recognized in civil law countries 
in Europe as well as Scandinavian countries.209 In those countries, all 
descendants are statutorily guaranteed some portion of the decedent’s 
estate.210 These regimes elevate kinship and promote stability and solidarity 
among families.211  
Many countries have family maintenance systems, which differ from 
forced heirship.212 In family maintenance systems, popular in the 
Commonwealth,213 dissatisfied dependents214 can initiate court proceedings 
to resolve conflict and gain access to an estate by appealing to a judge’s 
discretion.215 Courts in these common law countries have the power to 
override a decedent’s will on equitable grounds.216 The Australian system 
uses a variety of factors to ensure that the testator’s children are cared for.217 
China’s law also encompasses a broad range of conduct that grants rewards, 
imposes punishment, and permits courts to alter a share by any amount,218 
even to nonfamily members who provided caregiving.219 
American inheritance law remains in the firm grip of the deadhand.220 
The U.S. is unlikely to ever adopt a system resembling family maintenance 
largely because it would increase litigation in our probate system.221 Forced 
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heirship, on the other hand, has the advantage of simplicity and certainty 
with no judicial burden.222 A revision to inheritance law recognizing forced 
heirship would not be as onerous as family maintenance. In fact, states and 
estate planners adapted to forced share reforms223 when spouses received 
elective share protections in the UPC in 1990.224 
A. Alternative Approaches 
Disinherited children may also look to tort law to access an estate. The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts225 and almost half of states now recognize 
intentional interference with an expected inheritance (“IIEI”) as a valid 
cause of action in tort.226 An IIEI claim is an alternative to a will contest 
whereby a beneficiary does not challenge the will. Rather, she seeks to 
recover damages from a third party for wrongful interference with an 
expectation of an inheritance.227  
A child who can pursue relief in tort rather than probate has many 
advantages. The statute of limitations in tort is longer than in probate.228 In 
tort, the clock starts when the plaintiff could have reasonably become aware 
of the claim instead of at the decedent’s death.229 Punitive damages are 
recoverable, the court may permit testimony from interested witnesses, and 
the plaintiff can bring a claim prior to the parent’s death.230 The IIEI action 
provides plaintiffs with a right to jury trial while a judge adjudicates probate 
claims and may be less sympathetic.231 An IIEI claim can be brought prior 
to the parent’s death.232 Finally, the IIEI tort has a lower standard of a 
preponderance of the evidence rather than clear and convincing evidence, 
which applies in probate claims.233 
There are also significant obstacles hindering a disinherited child from 
bringing an IIEI claim. An IIEI claim may not be brought if a will contest 
is available and if there is a remedy in probate that would provide the injured 
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party with adequate relief.234 IIEI also has the third-party defendant 
requirement.235The standard required to prove an IIEI claim is a reasonable 
certainty that, but for the defendant’s interference, the plaintiff would have 
received the inheritance.236 Finally, the tort is new and undeveloped, leaving 
room for significant trial and error. 
The probate system goes to great lengths to preserve a decedent’s 
testamentary intent.237 It does so without recognizing the natural right to 
inherit.238 The courts’ recognition of IIEI only goes so far as to not interfere 
or undermine the probate system’s underlying goal of protecting 
testamentary freedom.239 IIEI claims are likely to undermine and destabilize 
the law of probate and create legal uncertainty.240  
There are not yet indications that IIEI claims may provide a work 
around for no-contest clauses.241 Munn v. Briggs held that the presence of a 
no-contest clause was not sufficient to establish an inadequate remedy in 
probate.242 The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that his remedy in 
probate was inadequate because the no-contest clause suppressed his 
challenge to the instrument in probate.243 In other words, an argument that 
a disinherited child must pursue an IIEI claim because a probate claim 
would trigger a no-contest clause is insufficient. There must be more than 
just a no-contest clause that deems a probate remedy inadequate. However, 
there is currently no California case law holding that bringing the IIEI tort 
itself violates a no-contest clause. A disinherited child may have nothing to 
lose by bringing an IIEI claim. 
Legislatures can adopt forced heirship and preserve testamentary 
freedom at the same time. Children would not be entitled to the whole estate 
but to a share. Legislatures may opt to enforce a child’s share only after the 
surviving spouse receives her elective share. The remainder can then be 
distributed to other family members, charity, and other dependents. 
Legislatures may enact disqualifying rules such as slayer, parental abuse, 
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elder abuse, etc., that will disinherit certain individuals automatically. In 
these ways, forced heirship would remain consistent with testamentary 
freedom and the values justifying spousal protections. Forced heirship 
satisfies the natural right to inherit, promotes equity among all children, 
satisfies the judicial interest in simple estate distribution with fewer will 
challenges, preserves family relationships, and accommodates the evolving 
family paradigm. Finally, a legal right to inherit would not interfere but 
work in tandem with testamentary freedom. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States should adopt a system that recognizes the natural 
right to inherit and protects children from disinheritance just as it does for 
spouses and other groups. Despite other industrialized nations’ recognition 
of the right to inherit, the harm that disinheritance imposes on children and 
families, and Locke’s recognition of a natural right to inherit, the United 
States continues to permit parents to disinherit their children.  
The use of no-contest clauses is improper considering the purposes 
stated by California courts and the Law Revision Commission. No-contest 
clauses as disinheritance devices interfere with the natural right to inherit. 
No-contest clauses should be used to guard against poaching by strangers 
who seek to encroach upon a decedent’s estate or where informal ownership 
creates confusion. All children, regardless of age or need, should be shielded 
from disinheritance based on arbitrary and rash decisions by their parents 
and should instead only be disqualified by the state for truly egregious 
behavior. Testators who decide to unilaterally punish their children with 
disinheritance do not have to live with the consequences of their disposition 
and should not wield the deadhand control that testamentary freedom 
provides. Statutory protections for surviving spouses and pretermitted 
children should be expanded to all children. The natural right to inherit 
should not cede to testamentary freedom; it should work in tandem with it. 
California courts go to great lengths to preserve testamentary intent by 
permitting the use of no-contest clauses to disinherit while failing to 
recognize the natural right to inherit. Disinherited children do not have a 
clear legal path for gaining access to an estate containing a no-contest clause 
even with the probable cause exception. Disinherited beneficiaries who 
attempt to thwart or circumvent a testator’s wishes are met with opposition. 
It is only when a disinherited beneficiary treads lightly in court by seeking 
interpretive guidance, asking questions of ownership, making challenges 
based on lack of mental capacity, or enforcing fiduciary supervision that a 
court may permit disinherited beneficiaries to make legal challenges. A 












disinherited beneficiary seeking to frustrate testamentary intent will not fare 
well. The IIEI tort, still in its infancy, is not yet developed enough to escape 
the grip of disinheritance. As case law continues to develop, disinherited 
children will continue to try gaining access to an estate until legislatures 
recognizes the natural right to inherit and institute a forced heirship regime. 
Forced heirship will elevate the natural right to inherit to equal footing 
with testamentary freedom. As John Locke recognized centuries ago, the 
natural right to inherit ought to be recognized alongside the natural right to 
bequest. Forced heirship can accomplish the benefits of more vibrant land 
markets, preservation of family relationships, and equality among all 
siblings. Forced heirship can create opportunities for important life 
investments for middle-aged adults, promote state interests, and result in 
more efficient use judicial resources. Above all else, forced heirship is the 
right thing to do for all children of testators, relieving them of the threat or 
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